ABSTRACT:The ethics of high frequency trading are obscure, due in part to the complexity of the practice. This article contributes to the existing literature of ethics in financial markets by examining a recent trend in regulation in high frequency trading, the prohibition of deception. We argue that in the financial markets almost any regulation, other than the most basic, tends to create a moral hazard and increase information asymmetry. Since the market’s job is, at least in part, price discovery, we (...) argue that simplicity of regulation and restraint in regulation are virtues to a greater extent than in other areas of finance. This article proposes criteria for determining which high-frequency trading strategies should be regulated. (shrink)

BackgroundThe use of human embryonic stem cells (ES cells) for the development of medical therapies is surrounded with moral concerns. The aim of this study was to assess the public’s attitudes toward the use of ES cells for treatment of Parkinson’s disease (PD) and other diseases, what factors are most important to consider when using ES cells for drug development, and if there is an association between religious beliefs and attitudes toward using ES cells for medical treatment.MethodsA randomly selected sample (...) of the Swedish public, aged 18–87-years-old, completed an online survey (n = 467). The survey assessed socio-demographics, religious views, perceived moral status of the embryo, and attitudes toward using ES cells for medical treatment of PD and other diseases. Adjusted odds ratios (ORs) and 95% confidence intervals (CI) for positive vs. negative attitude toward using ES cells for drug development were computed using logistic regression.ResultsThe respondents were positive about using ES for treatment; specifically, 70% totally agreed that it is acceptable to use ES cells for treatment of PD, while 40% totally agreed that it is acceptable to use ES cells for treatment but induced pluripotent cells is just as efficient. Religion being of little importance in one’s life was associated with a positive attitude toward using ES cells for treatment of PD (adjusted OR 6.39, 95% CI 2.78–14.71). The importance of being able “to access new, effective treatments against diseases that do not have any treatment available” was ranked as the most important factor to consider when using ES cells for drug development.ConclusionMost respondents are positive about using ES cells for drug development, and making effective treatments accessible to those who do not have any. However, these attitudes are influenced by the specific disorder that the drug development is intended for, as well as the religious views and perceived moral status of the early embryo. (shrink)

The comparison of Ernst Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms and Levi-Strauss’ structural anthropology requires a clarification of their definitions of morphology, transformation and translatability. We will expose the morphological field where Cassirer’s aesthetics emerges in relation to Goethe, who represents an important source for Levi-Strauss as well. Defining the concept of transformation is supposed to follow his modifications of the key ideas of the German poet and biologist, by taking account of the new point of view provided by the theory (...) of groups of transformation which the mathematician Felix Klein developed in the »circle of Erlangen «. Then we will show how Edgar Wind, a brilliant student of Cassirer, invents a kind of morphological aesthetics to provide art history with a methodology, and we will give some examples for the application of the concept of building series of pictures in the field of art history. We will examine the global function of the tables of Aby Warburg’s Atlas Mnemosyne, Erwin Panofsky’s wellknown iconological interpretation of Durer’s Melencolia I and then, by contrast, the creation of a virtual series of masks through an imaginative variation which Levi-Strauss creates to give sense to a particular Ameridian mask found during his investigations. Finally, we will investigate the problems appearing by the definition of transformation as translatability in both Cassirer’s and Levi-Strauss’ semiologies. We will ask for their uses of the model of translation in linguistics to compare different forms of structural homologies. (shrink)

This article responds to Srinivas Aravamudan's call to revisit the notion of the trace from the standpoint of the Anthropocene. A Derridean understanding of the trace shows how postcolonial difference challenges the humanist distinction between human and nature by questioning the distinction between life and death that is central to metaphysics. This discussion thus reframes the prospect of extinction signaled by the Anthropocene by means of a return to a Marxist, feminist, psychoanalytic and deconstructive trajectory within postcolonial thought.

The paper reviews Cassirer's recent reception in France and takes two international meetings in Rennes and Paris as an opportunity to determine current research interests in this area. A striking feature of French concern is the stress on art historical contextualization of Cassirer's thought (Riegl, Wolfflin, Panofsky).

L'anthropologie de l'art est une discipline relativement récente, qui naît au carrefour de plusieurs sciences humaines à la fin du XIXe siècle et qui se développe au XXe siècle jusqu'à connaître sa floraison actuelle. On entend par ce terme les études qui traitent de l'art par le prisme de la diversité des cultures, donc constamment tourné vers d'autres formes telles que le langage, le rituel, la technique et la science avec lesquelles il interagit. Cet ouvrage aborde des œuvres qui ont (...) un caractère esthétique, mais également une signification culturelle et des fonctions techniques, cognitives, sociales et politiques diverses. Au travers d'un panorama qui ne se prétend pas exhaustif, ce sont les conditions de son émergence que nous voudrions analyser ici avec les figures pionnières qui ont accompagné son avènement et le déploiement qu'en offrent quelques-unes des principales figures plus contemporaines pour mieux en saisir la diversité et la richesse"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

BackgroundHuman embryonic stem cells as a source for the development of advanced therapy medicinal products are considered for treatment of Parkinson’s disease. Research has shown promising results and opened an avenue of great importance for patients who currently lack a disease modifying therapy. The use of hESC has given rise to moral concerns and been the focus of often heated debates on the moral status of human embryos. Approval for marketing is still pending.ObjectiveTo Investigate the perspectives and concerns of patients (...) with PD, patients being the directly concerned stakeholders in the ethical discussion.MethodsQualitative semi-structured interviews related to this new therapy in seventeen patients from two Swedish cities.ResultsThe participants expressed various interests related to the use of human embryos for development of medicinal therapies; however, overall, they were positive towards the use of hESC for treatment of PD. It was deemed important that the donating woman or couple made the choice to donate embryos voluntarily. Furthermore, there were concerns that the industry does not always prioritise the patient over profit; thus, transparency was seen as important. (shrink)

All of finance is now automated, most notably high frequency trading. This paper examines the ethical implications of this fact. As automation is an interdisciplinary endeavor, we argue that the interfaces between the respective disciplines can lead to conflicting ethical perspectives; we also argue that existing disciplinary standards do not pay enough attention to the ethical problems automation generates. Conflicting perspectives undermine the protection those who rely on trading should have. Ethics in finance can be expanded to include organizational and (...) industry-wide responsibilities to external market participants and society. As a starting point, quality management techniques can provide a foundation for a new cross-disciplinary ethical standard in the age of automation. (shrink)

BackgroundNew disease-modifying ways to treat Parkinson’s disease (PD) may soon become a reality with intracerebral transplantation of cell products produced from human embryonic stem cells (hESCs). The aim of this study was to assess what factors influence preferences of patients with PD regarding stem-cell based therapies to treat PD in the future.MethodsPatients with PD were invited to complete a web-based discrete choice experiment to assess the importance of the following attributes: (i) type of treatment, (ii) aim of treatment, (iii) available (...) knowledge of the different types of treatments, (iv) effect on symptoms, and (v) risk for severe side effects. Latent class conditional logistic regression models were used to determine preference estimates and heterogeneity in respondents’ preferences.ResultsA substantial difference in respondents’ preferences was observed in three latent preference patterns (classes). “Effect on symptoms” was the most important attribute in class 1, closely followed by “type of treatment,” with medications as preferred to other treatment alternatives. Effect on symptoms was also the most important attribute in class 2, with treatment with hESCs preferred over other treatment alternatives. Likewise for class 3, that mainly focused on “type of treatment” in the decision-making. Respondents’ class membership was influenced by their experience in treatment, side effects, and advanced treatment therapy as well as religious beliefs.ConclusionsMost of the respondents would accept a treatment with products emanating from hESCs, regardless of views on the moral status of embryos. Preferences of patients with PD may provide guidance in clinical decision-making regarding treatments deriving from stem cells. (shrink)

Bien au-delà de la seule philosophie, le débat à Davos en 1929 entre Cassirer et Heidegger a marqué l'histoire des idées. Il a même donné naissance à des récits passablement légendaires qui négligeaient le contexte historique précis. Un nouveau regard s'impose, à la lumière des œuvres publiées depuis lors. Les vingt-cinq tomes de l'édition allemande de référence de Cassirer ne sont disponibles que depuis 2007.0S'y s'ajoutent les dix-sept tomes du Nachlass depuis 2017. Des 102 volumes de la Gesamtausgabe de Heidegger, (...) édition de référence mais sans garantie scientifique, moins d'une dizaine reste programmée, mais d'ores et déjà la publication des cinq premiers volumes des Cahiers noirs a permis d'engager une relecture critique de l'ensemble. C'est donc à présent seulement que l'on peut véritablement évaluer les projets contrastés des deux auteurs.0Leurs enjeux intéressent notamment le statut de la rationalité et des sciences, en particulier celles de la culture, aussi bien que le statut de la technique parmi les formes symboliques. Et tout autant, l'opposition entre la démocratie et la théologie politique ; entre la légitimité du cosmopolitisme et l'ontologie identitaire ; enfin, entre la possibilité même d'une éthique ou son rejet de principe.0Tous ces thèmes contradictoires exigent aujourd'hui une révision critique, non seulement rétrospective, mais aussi ancrée dans le présent. Car au-delà même de la philosophie, des courants de pensée et des forces politiques en Europe et dans le monde poursuivent ces deux voies qui s'opposent aujourd'hui. (shrink)

Bundel filosofische voordrachten over de object-kenmerken van voorwerpen van esthetisch welgevallen.

The thesis developed and defended in this paper is that is it false that all knowledge is founded on experience. Much of our knowledge (or alleged knowledge), it is argued, is based on testimony. Still, many philosophers have either not dealt with testimony at all, or treated it very unkindly. One of the reasons for this is that those philosophers (such as Descartes and Locke) work with a concept of knowledge according to which knowledge is certain, indubitable, and/or self-evident. And (...) if knowledge is what these philosophers say it is, then there is no such thing as knowledge based on testimony indeed. Thomas Reid is introduced as holding that we do have testimonial knowledge and that therefore Descartes' and Locke's concept of knowledge is untenable. Reid furthermore holds that human beings are endowed with a disposition to accept or believe what otherstell us („the principle of credulity”). The working of this principle is refined through all kinds of experience. What Reid says or shows is how this disposition in fact operates. Many epistemologists, however, have higher aspirations and look for reasons or arguments that can justify our factual acceptance of testimony. The inductive argument Hume offers, it is argued, is unconvincing. There is even reason to think that the principle of credulity can never be justified by adducing reasons. This does not imply, however, that acceptance of testimony is unjustified. Whether or not it is depends, among other things, on the concept of justification one uses. On an internalist concept of justification (as Locke's or Hume's) this disposition may never be justified. But on an externalist conception it may. This may be disappointing, given some widely held philosophical aspirations, but at the same time it is, as Alston has said, a lesson in intellectual humility. (shrink)

This article is a discussion of Hume's maxim Nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible. First I explain this maxim and distinguish it from the principle Whatever cannot be imagined (conceived), is impossible. Next I argue that Thomas Reid's criticism of the maxim fails and that the arguments by Tamar Szábo Gendler and John Hawthorne for the claim that "it is uncontroversial that there are cases where we are misled" by the maxim are unconvincing. Finally I state the limited but real (...) value of the maxim: it does help us, in certain cases, reliably to make up our minds. Along the way I show that Reid, his criticism of the maxim notwithstanding, actually employs it, and I furthermore argue that the principle What is inconceivable, is impossible is spurious. (shrink)

An increasing number of transcription factors both from prokaryotic and eukaryotic sources are found to bend the DNA upon binding to their recognition site. Bending can easily be detected by the anomalous electrophoretic behaviour of the DNA‐protein complex or by increased cyclization of DNA fragments containing the protein‐induced bend. Induction of DNA bending by transcription factors could regulate transcription in various ways. Bending may bring distantly bound transcription factors closer together by facilitating DNA‐looping or it could mediate the interaction between (...) transcription factors and the general transcription machinery by formation of large nucleoprotein structures in which the DNA is wrapped around the protein complex. Alternatively, the energy stored in a protein‐induced bend could be used to favour formation of an open transcription complex or to dissociate the RNA polymerase in the transition from initiation to elongation. Modification of the bend angles and bending centers, caused by homodimerization or heterodimerization of transcription factors, may well turn out to be an important way to enlarge the range of interactions required for regulation of gene expression. (shrink)

Contextualists explain certain intuitions regarding knowledge ascriptions by means of the thesis that 'knowledge' behaves like an indexical. This explanation denies what Peter Unger has called invariantism, i.e., the idea that knowledge ascriptions have truth value independent of the context in which they are issued. This paper aims to provide an invariantist explanation of the contextualist's intuitions, the core of which is that 'knowledge' has many different senses.

Ever since at least Aristotle, it has been widely recognized that a theory of responsibility must allow for the fact that in certain conditions agents are excused for not doing what they ought to do —and accordingly that they cannot be held responsible for what they did not, or did, do. In such conditions they are not appropriate candidates for one of what Strawson has called the "reactive attitudes" such as resentment, contempt, gratitude, and affection. Let us call such conditions (...) excusing conditions. The main aim of this paper is to show that the very same conditions that can excuse agents for not doing what they ought to do , also can excuse them for having false beliefs. As an afterthought it is suggested that this is a reason for thinking that humans can sometimes be held responsible for what they believe. (shrink)

This introduction presents an overview of the articles in this special issue, within the framework of an argument for the conclusion that there are various roads leading from imagination to knowledge.

At the same time new versions of foundationalism were crafted, that were claimed to be immune to the earlier criticisms. This volume contains 12 papers in which various aspects of this dialectic are covered.

The idea that we can properly be held responsible for what we believe underlies large stretches of our social and institutional life; without that idea in place, social and institutional life would be unthinkable, and more importantly, it would stumble and fall. At the same time, philosophers have argued that this idea is strange, puzzling, beyond belief, false, meaningless or at any rate defective. The first section develops the alleged problem. The burden of this paper, however, is not to discuss (...) the merits of this idea but rather to measure the damage in case the idea turns out to be defective indeed. This is done by substantiating the claim that this idea indeed underlies large and important stretches of our social and institutional life. Section 2 substantiates that claim by presenting the results of a web search on the use of what I call "deontological epistemic expressions", i.e. expressions in which deontological and epistemological notions (both broadly construed) are combined; examples are "obligation to believe", "not permitted to forget", "right to know". The ubiquitous use of these expressions, I argue, is linguistic evidence for the claim that the contested idea indeed pervades our social life. Linguistic evidence, however, can be frail and misleading. From the fact that we say that the shade is moving we cannot conclude that shades really exist; likewise it may not be permitted to conclude from the ubiquitous use of deontological epistemic expressions that there really are doxastic obligations (and hence doxastic responsibilities). The third section, therefore, moves beyond the linguistic evidence and discusses two social institutions, viz. education and law as we find them in modern Western societies, and argues that they cannot be made sense of unless the contested idea is in place. Educational and legal systems of course vary greatly throughout the Western world. Such differences as exist, however, are irrelevant for the claim I will be making in this paper. The final section states the conclusion. (shrink)

Our lives are increasingly intertwined with the digital realm, and with new technology, new ethical problems emerge. The academic field that addresses these problems—which we tentatively call ‘digital ethics’—can be an important intellectual resource for policy making and regulation. This is why it is important to understand how the new ethical challenges of a digital society are being met by academic research. We have undertaken a scientometric analysis to arrive at a better understanding of the nature, scope and dynamics of (...) the field of digital ethics. Our approach in this paper shows how the field of digital ethics is distributed over various academic disciplines. By first having experts select a collection of keywords central to digital ethics, we have generated a dataset of articles discussing these issues. This approach allows us to generate a scientometric visualisation of the field of digital ethics, without being constrained by any preconceived definitions of academic disciplines. We have first of all found that the number of publications pertaining to digital ethics is exponentially increasing. We furthermore established that whereas one may expect digital ethics to be a species of ethics, we in fact found that the various questions pertaining to digital ethics are predominantly being discussed in computer science, law and biomedical science. It is in these fields, more than in the independent field of ethics, that ethical discourse is being developed around concrete and often technical issues. Moreover, it appears that some important ethical values are very prominent in one field (e.g., autonomy in medical science), while being almost absent in others. We conclude that to get a thorough understanding of, and grip on, all the hard ethical questions of a digital society, ethicists, policy makers and legal scholars will need to familiarize themselves with the concrete and practical work that is being done across a range of different scientific fields to deal with these questions. (shrink)

This paper discusses some arguments against some traditional 'proofs of God's existence'. First it is argued that it is not obvious that these arguments are fallacious. Secondly, I try to articulate why so many Protestant thinkers maintained a hostile attitude toward the traditional proofs. I argue that their attitude was shaped by the conviction that belief in God is epistemically justified even when it is not based on argument or proof. I reconstruct Bavinck's treatment of the traditional proofs as a (...) rejection of what has come to be called 'classical foundationalism'. Lastly I try to show that even though Protestant thinkers were right in claiming that one does not need any of the traditional arguments in order to be epistemically justified in believing that God exists, this does not imply that such arguments are without any value. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Thomas Reid on MemoryRené van Woudenbergthis paper is a discussion of Thomas Reid’s views on memory as an “avenue of knowledge.” Part 1 deals with various remarks Reid makes concerning memory, knowledge, and belief which he holds to be “obvious and certain.” Part contains a more detailed discussion of Reid’s thesis that “memory is unaccountable.” Part 3 inquires how Reid’s critique of the Way of Ideas fits with his (...) own views on memory.Reid’s dealings with memory are part of his broader inquiries into the intellectual faculties of the human mind. In the Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man Reid discusses not only memory, but other avenues of knowledge as well, such as perception and reasoning. In these essays Reid is doing straight epistemology. This is not to deny that Reid addresses other topics as well. In the essay on memory, for instance, Reid criticizes John Locke’s account of personal identity. But even then his discussion focusses on epistemological matters; one of his conclusions, for example, is that Locke confounded personal identity with the evidence we have of our personal identity, a thesis, Reid points out, that is bristled with absurd consequences. Although, then, Reid’s views on memory are related with his views on personal identity, I will abstain from a discussion of the latter. His epistemology of memory, I think, warrants attention in its own right.11. memory, knowledge, and beliefI.IIn Essay III of his Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man [1784],2 entitled “Of Memory,” Reid writes: [End Page 117]It is by memory that we have an immediate knowledge of things past. The senses give us information of things only as they exist in the present moment.(EIP 339)Memory, says Reid, gives us knowledge of things past, whereas sense perception gives us knowledge of things present. Reid takes it to be “obvious and certain” (as the title of the first chapter of Essay III indicates) that “The object of memory, or thing remembered, must be something that is past; as the object of perception... must be something which is present. What now is, cannot be an object of memory; neither can that which is past and gone be an object of perception” (EIP 340).These remarks may, however, occasion some doubts. One way of explaining Reid’s remark that the object of memory is something that is past, is that whenever someone, S, remembers something, viz., that p, p will be a proposition about something that is past.3 This explanation gives the right result for such propositions as there was snowfall in late August, and she once visited Finland4 But, as Norman Malcolm has observed, it does not always give the right results.5 For, he says, there are cases of S remembering that p, where p is not a proposition about the past. Let p be his telephone number is 2 79-289-59 75, or his car is in the garage. What is remembered, in these cases, is a proposition about something that is not past, but present (or: about what is presently the case). It is, so it seems at least, possible for S to remember the present.It even seems possible for S “to remember the future” (something Aristotle deemed impossible).6 S can remember, for instance, that the game starts at 8:00 P.M., or that there will be elections next year.No doubt some will find these suggestions preposterous. Still, we say such things as “I remember my telephone number” and “I remember the game starts at 8:00 P.M.” Someone who balks at the suggestion that we can remember present and even future things, therefore, has to find a way of dealing with these quite common modes of saying. One way would be to argue that these manners of saying are incorrect, another that they are elliptical. Since the first thesis is unconvincing (it is, after all, correct, i.e., correct English to use the expressions under consideration), we are left with the second, viz., that these modes of saying are elliptical. Can this be made acceptable? Let us see.Might... (shrink)

In this paper I explore, in sections 2 and 3, respectively, Herman Dooyeweerd’s notion of naive experience and the notion of common sense as found in the writings of Thomas Reid and G. E. Moore. I argue in section 4 that naive experience and common sense are assigned a structurally similar functional role by their advocates—viz., the role of touchstone for philosophy. In the final section I stage a conversation between Dooyeweerd and Reid about the touchstones they adopt.

This paper derives, from Richard Moran’s work, three different accounts of doxastic Transparency—roughly, the view that when a rational person wants to know whether she believes that p, she directs her attention to the truth-value of p, not to the mental attitude she has vis-à-vis p. We investigate which of these is the most plausible of the three by discussing a number of examples. We conclude that the most plausible account of Transparency is in tension with the motivation behind Transparency (...) accounts: it is disconnected from the deliberative stance. (shrink)

Bijdragen over de actuele betekenis van de filosofie, met name de Reformatorische Wijsbegeerte.

De apostel Paulus spreekt in één van zijn brieven over ‘de verduistering van het verstand’ — een verduistering die het gevolg is van zonde.1 In het werk van een groot aantal filosofen uit de westerse filosofische traditie heeft dit woord van Paulus op een of andere wijze weerklank gevonden. Bij Augustinus, Anselmus, Thomas van Aquino, Jonathan Edwards, Kierkegaard, John Henry Newman en Franz von Baader bijvoorbeeld, en in ons land bij Abraham Kuyper en Herman Dooyeweerd, vindt men reflecties over de (...) noëtische gevolgen van de zonde.2 Deze denkers hebben de noëtische doorwerking van de zonde onder meer aangewezen in de volgende verschijnselen: dat mensen allerlei onware gedachten hebben dat onze kenvermogens lang niet altijd naar behoren functioneren, zoals onder andere blijkt uit geheugenzwakte, misperceptie en foutief redeneren dat mensen het vaak onderling oneens zijn. (shrink)